September 11, 2023

A new(ish) report from Transport Canada on a major incident of track-side fire caused by CP railway provides some additional information why current automated wayside systems may not be sufficient to stop trackside fires.

On 08 July 2021, Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CP) train 880-066 was travelling eastward on the Cranbrook Subdivision near Caithness, British Columbia, when its mid-train distributed power locomotive sustained a mechanical failure that resulted in flames emanating from the exhaust stack.

• Our analysis should include comment about where and why track inspection technology is being implemented by the companies.
• Implementation of rail safety technology should be regulated to enure proper levels of investment in the correct technology to maximize safety of rail travel.

• Rail Safety Investigation Report

Many railways use third-party equipment integrated into their locomotives’ control and mechanical systems to wirelessly transmit select data from the various locomotives operating on a train to a central data processing centre. These systems, which are in widespread use in North America, enable a railway to remotely monitor the operation of locomotives and can enable real-time monitoring of technical information (diagnostics, customizable alerts, etc.) about locomotive health, including diesel engine performance. However, these systems have not been designed to detect the presence of locomotive fires and to alert train crews.

In addition, North American railways use strategically located wayside inspection systems to monitor select safety-critical parameters as trains pass by, such as the temperature of rail car wheels/bearings and the presence of dragging equipment.

However, these wayside detectors are not equipped with cameras or heat sensors to detect fire on a passing train, and more specifically a fire on a remotely located locomotive.

• Railway Extreme Heat and Fire Risk Mitigation Rules, which RCA filed on its own initiative with the Minister of Transport pursuant to subsection 20(1) of the Railway Safety Act has several parts that are supposed to address these issues.

However, self-regulation continues to lag the growth of major incidents in this area.